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Claimed and Unclaimed Experience: Problematic Readings of Trauma in the Hebrew Bible 
 
Introduction: Trauma in the study of the Hebrew Bible 
The cultural sociologist Jeffrey Alexander points out, quite correctly, that the study of trauma 
within literary criticism has much in common with its study in psychoanalysis,
1
 especially 
insofar as both fields see trauma as something victims have failed to fully experience and so as 
something they do not truly know, and that manifests itself in psychologically intrusive 
repetition. In works of literary critics who discuss trauma, references to Freud’s works, such as 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle and “The Uncanny,” are commonly discussed, as are his 
conclusions concerning trauma victims’ failure of experience and knowledge. Trauma is studied 
in many fields besides these, including philosophy, history, law, and, in the twenty-first century, 
biblical studies, but the meaning of trauma can vary from field to field.
2
 In sociology, for 
example, Alexander’s field, trauma is not what is unexperienced and unknown—“unclaimed 
experience,” to use Cathy Caruth’s expression—but something created and negotiated by the 
group. Sociologists tend to focus on the active work of groups as they provide meaning for 
trauma, while literary critical and psychoanalytical approaches emphasize the ways in which 
individuals passively endure trauma as it continually intrudes into their psychological lives, even 
as they fail to understand it. For sociologists, trauma is generally understood to be claimed 
experience, the creation of meaning rather than an absence of it, and they can be quite clear that a 
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 J.C. Alexander, Trauma: A Social Theory (London: Polity, 2012), pp. 7-12. 
2
 For a brief survey of the impact and development of trauma studies in different 
disciplines in the twentieth century, see R. Luckhurst, The Trauma Question (London: 
Routledge, 2008), pp. 1-15. 
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social creation of trauma is not to be equated with the suffering of individuals within the group.
3
 
The field of biblical studies—or at least the study of the Hebrew Bible, where we will 
concentrate our analysis—has, in its early stages of using trauma theory, been strongly 
influenced by the sociological approach. This is sometimes evident when scholars explicitly rely 
on the work of sociologists like Alexander or Kai Erikson, but it is more frequently manifested in 
arguments that the meanings produced by biblical texts gave members of an ancient Judean or 
Israelite society ways to make sense of the events that led to their suffering. Studies that fall into 
the latter category may not specifically refer to sociological theory, but they are clearly drawing 
on the sociological notion of trauma as claimed experience, as investing the past with meaning, 
although, unlike sociological analysis, these studies will often make the additional argument that 
these texts played a role in the victims’ process of recovery, a claim sometimes found also in 
studies of biblical literature that explicitly follow a sociological approach. This focus on trauma 
as claimed experience is so influential within biblical studies that the field has often failed to deal 
adequately with the understanding of trauma in psychoanalytical and literary criticism, which 
focuses on trauma as unclaimed experience, what is not known by victims and what has no 
meaning for them. This article explains why our failure as biblical scholars to fully consider the 
psychoanalytical/literary critical approach to trauma will lead to a misunderstanding of the 
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 See, for example, the comments in J.C. Alexander and E.B. Breese, “Introduction: On 
Social Suffering and its Cultural Construction,” in R. Eyerman, J.C. Alexander, and E.B. Breese 
(eds.), Narrating Trauma: On the Impact of Collective Suffering (Yale Cultural Sociology Series; 
Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2011), pp. xi-xxxv (xiv-xxii), which refer to the ways in 
which the essays in that collection have distinguished between social narratives about trauma and 
the collective suffering of group members. 
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therapeutic role the ancient texts we study could play, a noticeable failure on our part, since 
determining the kinds of therapeutic roles such texts had in the context of trauma is normally the 
point of our analysis. 
It might seem obvious that what is beneficial for a society will be beneficial for 
individuals within it, and that a narrative that provides an intellectual framework that explains 
trauma to a group and results in social cohesion should also be able to give such meaning to 
individual victims, playing a role in a therapeutic process for trauma sufferers. But, as we shall 
see, while the construction of meaning by the community can promote social goods such as 
group cohesion, such explanation will not prove therapeutic for individual victims of trauma; 
such therapy is accomplished through the emergence of the victim’s voice in testimony to trauma 
that is received by an empathetic listener, not through the social imposition of an explanatory 
narrative. Social speech that provides meaning and explanation for a traumatic event will not be 
successful in creating group cohesion if many traumatized victims within the community speak 
about the trauma as something without meaning; social narratives about trauma will only work, 
then, if they silence such voices and make victims repress their trauma, and so these narratives 
are actually anti-therapeutic for trauma sufferers. The general failure on our part to take account 
of this when we read biblical texts has, at times, led us to conclude that biblical narratives that 
claim the experience of trauma for readers would have been therapeutic for individual victims 
when this was not the case. Even some therapists have, in the past, imposed narratives over the 
testimonies of their traumatized patients, silencing their voices and frustrating their therapy,
4
 and 
                                                 
4
 For a discussion of therapists of American Vietnam War veterans imposing narratives 
over their patients’ trauma in order to have them understand themselves as successful warriors, 
see K. Tal, Worlds of Hurt: Reading the Literatures of Trauma (Cambridge Studies in American 
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so our failure as biblical scholars to fully acknowledge the psychoanalytical/literary 
understanding of trauma as unclaimed experience becomes even more acute when the possibility 
exists that our misunderstandings of the therapeutic value of these texts might be adopted by 
practitioners of pastoral care. So, for example, the introductory essay to Bible through the Lens 
of Trauma, a recent collection of studies of trauma in biblical literature, claims that the use of 
trauma theory in biblical studies can “inform pastoral praxis with those affected by trauma,”
5
 and 
two of the essays within this collection were written by specialists in pastoral care—those by 
Philip Browning Helsel and Peter Yuichi Clark—pointing to an interest from that field in current 
discussions of trauma in biblical studies. Kathleen O’Connor, to take another example, describes 
Jeremiah as “a book of pastoral care,”
6
 even though she argues that an important point of the 
book is to “re-symbolize reality” in the face of the destructive chaos of trauma, to create meaning 
by explaining or making sense of the trauma, in other words.
7
  
Certainly not every analysis that uses some sort of trauma theory to read texts in the 
Hebrew Bible adopts a sociological approach or a conception of trauma as claimed experience, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Literature and Culture; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 147-53. 
5
 C.G. Frechette and E. Boase, “Defining ‘Trauma’ as a Useful Lens for Biblical 
Interpretation,” in C.G. Frechette and E. Boase (eds.), Bible through the Lens of Trauma 
(SBLSemS, 86; Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016), pp. 1-23 (13). 
6
 K.M. O’Connor, “How Trauma Studies Can Contribute to Old Testament Studies,” in 
Eve-Marie Becker, Jan Dochhorn, and Else Kragelund Holt (eds.), Trauma and Traumatization 
in Individual and Collective Dimensions: Insights from Biblical Studies and Beyond (SANt, 2 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), pp. 210-22 (211-13, 220). 
7
 O’Connor, “How Trauma Studies Can Contribute,” p. 213. 
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but to give some representative sense of the dominance of these sorts of readings in the field, we 
can examine the essays in three recent collections that are largely or at least partially devoted to 
the study of trauma in the Hebrew Bible. Bible through the Lens of Trauma (2016) includes ten 
such essays, Trauma and Traumatization in Individual and Collective Dimensions (2014)
8
 has 
seven, and there are four in Interpreting Exile (2011).
9
 Of these twenty-one essays by seventeen 
different scholars, six focus on the ways in which various biblical texts would have functioned to 
heal a social group,
10
 and half of these argue or at least imply that these texts that provide 
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 E.-M. Becker, J. Dochhorn, and E. Kragelund Holt, eds., Trauma and Traumatization in 
Individual and Collective Dimensions: Insights from Biblical Studies and Beyond (SANt, 2; 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014). 
9
 B.E. Kelle, F.R. Ames, and J. Wright, eds., Interpreting Exile: Displacement and 
Deportation in Biblical and Modern Contexts (SBLAIL, 9; Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2011). Although the essay by Daniel Smith-Christopher in this collection does have 
the word “trauma” in its title, it focuses more on social psychological approaches in general than 
on reading biblical texts through the lens of one kind of trauma theory, and so I am not including 
it in my count of essays. 
10
 In Bible through the Lens of Trauma, see E. Boase, “Fragmented Voices: Collective 
Identity and Traumatization in Lamentations,” pp. 49-66 (and for her emphasis on a sociological 
approach, see especially 49 and 53-56) and P. Browning Helsel, “Shared Pleasure to Soothe the 
Broken Spirit: Collective Trauma and Qoheleth,” pp. 85-103 (especially 85-90); in Trauma and 
Traumatization see E.K. Holt, “Daughter Zion: Trauma, Collective Memory and Gender in OT 
Poetics,” pp. 162-76 (166-69) and Boase, “The Traumatized Body: Communal Trauma and 
Somatization in Lamentations,” pp. 193-209 (193-94); and in Interpreting Exile, see W. Morrow, 
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meaning for trauma would also have been therapeutic for trauma victims.
11
 Another nine argue 
that particular biblical texts would have been therapeutic for readers suffering from trauma, and 
five of these claim that the texts’ explanation of trauma would have contributed to victims’ 
healing,
12
 while the other four argue that writings such as Job or particular psalms provided 
textual models trauma sufferers could use to deal with their trauma.
13
 The four in the very last 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Deuteronomy 7 in Postcolonial Perspective: Cultural Fragmentation and Renewal,” pp. 275-93 
(287-88) and D.M. Carr, “Reading into the Gap: Refractions of Trauma in Israelite Prophecy,” 
pp. 295-308 (302-305). 
11
 Boase, “Fragmented Voices,” p. 51 (a discussion of Judith Herman’s work on recovery 
for individual victims); Morrow, “Deuteronomy 7,” p. 289; and Carr, “Reading into the Gap,” 
pp. 299-302. 
12
 In Bible through the Lens of Trauma, see M.S. Odell, “Fragments of Traumatic 
Memory: Ṣalmê zākār and Child Sacrifice in Ezekiel 16:15-22,” pp. 107-24 (113-14) and L. 
Stulman, “Reflections on the Prose Sermons in the Book of Jeremiah: Duhm’s and Mowinckel’s 
Contributions to Contemporary Trauma,” pp. 125-39 (132-35); in Trauma and Traumatization, 
see Stulman, “Reading the Bible through the Lens of Trauma and Art,” pp. 177-92 (182-89) and 
O’Connor, “How Trauma Studies Can Contribute,” pp. 213-17; and in Interpreting Exile, see 
J.L. Rumfelt, “Reversing Fortune: War, Pyschic Trauma, and the Promise of Narrative Repair,” 
pp. 323-42 (325-29). 
13
 In Bible through the Lens of Trauma, see C.G. Frechette, “Daughter Babylon Raped 
and Bereaved (Isaiah 47): Symbolic Violence and Meaning-Making in Recovery from Trauma,” 
pp. 67-83 (74) and B. Strawn, “Trauma, Psalmic Disclosure, and Authentic Happiness,” pp. 143-
60 (144-49, 154-55); and in Trauma and Traumatization see K. Nielsen, “Post-traumatic Stress 
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category are not quite arguing that the texts claim experience on the victims’ behalf, although 




In this sample of recent essays, then, we see a fair amount of emphasis on analysis of 
texts as functioning to claim the experience of trauma for readers. There is certainly nothing 
wrong with examinations of the potentially beneficial social effects of biblical literature in 
response to massive trauma, and scholarship has done some important work in this regard; the 
central problem I am identifying arises when the field assumes that what is therapeutic for the 
group in this context will be equally so for traumatized individuals within it. An examination 
below of psychoanalytical and literary critical insights in regard to trauma will demonstrate that 
this is not so, and functions as a plea that we in the field take fuller account of these insights as 
we read biblical texts so that we and our readers rightly understand what kinds of therapeutic 
effects these texts did and did not have. One could argue that even investigations focused solely 
on the impact of biblical texts on the social group in the context of trauma should at least 
mention that these texts would have been anti-therapeutic for individual trauma victims within 
                                                                                                                                                             
Disorder and the Book of Job,” pp. 62-70 (68-69) and Frechette, “Destroying the Internalized 
Perpetrator: A Healing Function of the Violent Language against Enemies in the Psalms,” pp. 
71-84 (71-72). 
14
 For a more positive view of the therapeutic efficacy of such texts, however, see G.O. 
West, “Between Text and Trauma: Reading Job with People Living with HIV,” in E. Boase and 
C.G. Frechette (eds.), Bible through the Lens of Trauma (SBLSemS, 86; Atlanta: SBL Press, 




the community. Our failure to mention this potentially misleads readers who have little 
experience with trauma theory into assuming that textual explanations that may have led to social 
cohesion could also have been therapeutic for trauma victims. Indeed, our failure in this regard 
seems to tacitly assent to the silencing of trauma victims and ignore their need to use their own 
voices if they are to be involved in a therapeutic process in recovery from trauma. 
The goal here is to deal with these problems created by our failure to fully consider the 
insights of the psychoanalytical and literary critical understanding of trauma, but we begin with 
the important work the field of Hebrew Bible has done in identifying the meanings that a variety 
of biblical writings have assigned to traumas that affected their readers. Once we have a broader 
sense of the ways in which biblical narratives can explain trauma and potentially act to shape 
social worldview and maintain group cohesion we can then examine why this social claiming of 
experience is anti-therapeutic for trauma victims. Scholarly analysis of these narrative 
explanations of trauma has tended to focus especially on writings that reflect the events 
associated with the exile, and so Christopher Frechette, for example, argues that the book of 
Jeremiah aims to create “group solidarity and identity” in response to the trauma of the 
destruction of Jerusalem.
15
 Jeremiah may blame Judah for their suffering, but this is done within 
the context of making meaning that reforms group identity to deal with the trauma that had such 
a devastating effect on the social worldview.
16
 Frechette is not the only scholar to read the book 
of Jeremiah as providing such meaning, one that includes blaming the victims; the understanding 
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 C.G. Frechette, “The Old Testament as Controlled Substance: How Insights from 
Trauma Studies Reveal Healing Capacities in Potentially Harmful Texts,” Int 69 (2015), pp. 20-
34 (28). 
16
 Frechette, “The Old Testament as Controlled Substance,” pp. 28-30. 
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here is that by explaining an event so horrific that it might seem to throw important social claims 
into radical question, the work helps restore to individuals a worldview that accords with the goal 
of reinforcing group cohesion.
17
 It is not difficult to imagine that the horror the exiles survived 
through a sixteen-month siege of Jerusalem, the consequent mass slaughter and rape that 
assumedly accompanied the city’s capture, and the forced migration to Babylon would have 
made survivors seriously doubt important aspects of the Judean worldview such as Yhwh’s 
control of history. By explaining the trauma, the book imposes order over social chaos and uses 
this reconstruction of social worldview to point to a hopeful future,
18
 although this does come 
with the cost of blaming the victims for the vast violence they have witnessed and for the 
suffering they have undergone. 
It is easy enough to see how Judeans who managed to survive siege, conquest, 
destruction, and forced migration might have begun to doubt the claims made for Yhwh’s power 
and the authority of the figures in the social hierarchy who made those claims; the creation or 
reformation of a believable worldview on the part of the social group makes complete sense in 
this context. As Alexander puts it, trauma in this sociological understanding is a construction 
created by a group that identifies a source of suffering—even, writes Alexander, if that suffering 
                                                 
17
 E.g., K.M. O’Connor, Jeremiah: Pain and Promise (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2011), pp. 35-45, 93-102; Carr, “Reading into the Gap,” p. 300; D.G. Garber, Jr., “A Vocabulary 
of Trauma in the Exilic Writings” in B.E. Kelle, F.R. Ames, and J. Wright (eds.),  Interpreting 
Exile: Displacement and Deportation in Biblical and Modern Contexts (SBLAIL, 9; Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), pp. 309-22 (318-20); O’Connor, “How Trauma Studies Can 
Contribute,” pp. 215-19; Stulman, “Reflections on the Prose Sermons.” 
18
 E.g., O’Connor, Jeremiah, pp. 103-13. 
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is based in an event that the community has invented—distributes responsibility for it, and 
establishes a victim, thus potentially reestablishing or strengthening social solidarity.
19
 From this 
point of view, trauma is a social construction of meaning, what Alexander refers to as a “master 
narrative” that alters collective identity. Not all sociologists are as willing as Alexander to sever 
trauma from historical reality; for example, while Arthur Neal refers to “national trauma” as part 
of a social narrative, he also roots the concept in actual historical events, such as the Japanese 
bombing of Pearl Harbor and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
20
 Nations may eventually conceive of 
traumas such as these as heroic national accomplishments or as national failures,
21
 and the social 
body might decide to commemorate them, glossing over their horrors in order to promote social 
goods.
22
 Ron Eyerman also understands cultural trauma to be a social construction that can form 
the basis of social identity, albeit a construction negotiated in response to an actual “tear in the 
social fabric,” such as slavery in the case of the African American community.
23
 And Vamik 
Volkan, while a psychologist, adopts something like the sociological approach in his discussion 
of “chosen trauma,” arguing that communities that have experienced massive trauma will share 
feelings, fantasies, and interpretations of the event and pass them on to following generations. 
                                                 
19
 Alexander, Trauma, pp. 13-19. 
20
 A.G. Neal, National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American 
Century (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 4-5. 
21
 Neal, National Trauma, pp. 203-204. 
22
 Neal, National Trauma, pp. 207-11. 
23
 R. Eyerman, Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of African American 




But even shared feelings of powerlessness, Volkan argues, can help bind a community together, 
and groups can choose to reawaken these and other feelings associated with the trauma—can 
deliberately claim this experience, in other words—even generations after the event, in order to 
portray a current enemy as responsible for its past trauma.
24
 
When traumas have affected an entire society and shaken the group to its core, it makes 
sense that the community would act to negotiate and construct a meaning for such an event, one 
that reformulates social identity to take account of it and stop the group from falling apart, and 
this has been an important focus of biblical scholarship as it uses the sociological understanding 
of trauma to analyze writings that respond to the exile. In the applications of trauma theory to 
Ezekiel, biblical scholarship has arrived at conclusions that sound much like those produced in 
its readings of Jeremiah; Ezekiel, like Jeremiah, blames the people for their suffering in order to 
reform a shattered worldview, a reformation that maintains Yhwh controls history and that 
suffering is not random but deserved,
25
 and like Jeremiah it points readers to a hopeful future.
26
 
                                                 
24
 V. Volkan, Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (New York: Farrar, 
Strauss and Giroux, 1997), pp. 36-49. The sociologist Kai Erikson, however, argues that 
communal bonds are almost always weakened rather than strengthened following widespread 
exposure to trauma within the community; see K. Erikson, “Notes on Trauma and Community,” 
in Cathy Caruth (ed.), Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995), pp. 183-99. 
25
 E.g., G. Yee, Poor Banished Children of Eve: Women as Evil in the Hebrew Bible 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), pp. 121-22; D.G. Garber, Jr., “Traumatizing Ezekiel, the 
Exilic Prophet,” in J.H. Ellens and W.G. Rollins (eds.), Psychology and the Bible: A New Way to 
Read the Scriptures (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), vol. 1, pp. 215-35 (226-27); B.E. 
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For William Morrow, Second Isaiah seems to be creating meaning to help exiles “reframe” their 
social worldview and their senses of self by locating meaning for the trauma they suffered.
27
 
Elizabeth Boase reads Lamentations as an attempt to create unity within a community 
fragmented by trauma, in part by distributing blame for it,
28
 although others argue the book 
deemphasizes explanations and the apportioning of blame.
29
 The Deuteronomistic History 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kelle, “Dealing with the Trauma of Defeat: The Rhetoric of the Devastation and Rejuvenation of 
Nature in Ezekiel,” JBL 128 (2009), pp. 469-90; N.R. Bowen, Ezekiel (AOTC; Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon Press, 2010), pp. 91-93; Garber, “A Vocabulary of Trauma,” pp. 318-20; R. Poser, 
Das Ezechielbuch als Trauma-Literatur (VTSup, 154; Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp. 642-44 (but see 
as well the nuanced discussions of guilt in Ezekiel 16 on pp. 371-409 and in Ezek 21:1-12 on pp. 
414-17); D.M. Carr, Holy Resilience: The Bible’s Traumatic Origins (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2014), pp. 76-77. 
26
 E.g., Bowen, Ezekiel, pp. 209-10. 
27
 W. Morrow, “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Vicarious Atonement in the Second 
Isaiah” in J.H. Ellens and W.G. Rollins (eds.), Psychology and the Bible: A New Way to Read the 
Scriptures (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), vol. 1, pp. 167-83; for the language of 
reframing of self and worldview, see 171. 
28
 Boase, “Fragmented Voices.” 
29
 E.g., T. Linafelt, Surviving Lamentations: Catastrophe, Lament, and Protest in the 
Afterlife of a Biblical Book (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 43-44, 53-54; 
K.M. O’Connor, Lamentations and the Tears of the World (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002), 
pp. 84-87, 99-108; Holt, “Daughter Zion,” pp. 171-74. Compare this with Boase, “Fragmented 
Voices,” pp. 60-62. 
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clearly seems to provide explanation for its exilic readers’ trauma by blaming them and their 
ancestors for their suffering (although readers might also locate deconstructions of this 
explanation as the narrative is thrown into question at many points),
30
 and Morrow argues that 




Analysis of Hebrew Bible texts through the lens of trauma theory has not been limited to 
writings that seem to reflect the baleful light of the destruction of Jerusalem and exile to 
Babylon: Qoheleth, for example, has been portrayed as working to restore social bonds disrupted 
through the collective trauma of Persian-period colonialism;
32
 psalms have been described as 
revivifying trauma survivors’ sense of self;
33
 and Hosea has been read as responding to trauma 
caused by Neo-Assyrian invasions in the eighth century BCE by blaming the people for their 
failure to remain loyal to their God.
34
 All of this work is potentially quite helpful in illuminating 
the social functions of such writings within ancient Judah and Israel. Earlier in the article, 
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 So, at least, according to the analysis in D. Janzen, The Violent Gift: Trauma’s 
Subversion of the Deuteronomistic History’s Narrative (LHBOTS, 561; New York: T & T Clark 
International, 2012). Louis Stulman points to a similar phenomenon within the prophetic books, 
where the certainties of their explanations of trauma are undermined within the books themselves 
(“Reading the Bible,” pp. 186-87). 
31
 Morrow, “Deuteronomy 7,” especially pp. 281-83. 
32
 Browning Helsel, “Shared Pleasure.” 
33
 Frechette, “Destroying the Internalized Perpetrator” and Strawn, “Trauma, Psalmic 
Disclosure, and Authentic Happiness.” 
34
 Carr, Holy Resilience, pp. 24-40. 
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however, we documented a not-uncommon tendency in the field to assume that a claiming of the 
experience of trauma can benefit individual victims as well as the group as a whole. Individual 
worldviews are, of course, formed by the societies of which they are a part, but that is precisely 
what is at stake here: the narratives created by societies to explain trauma promote social goods 
and aim to form the identities of the individuals within the society in particular ways, but these 
narratives will only be successful insofar as they are widely accepted, and in groups replete with 
individual sufferers of trauma this will demand that victims repress their speech about the non-
experience and meaninglessness of trauma, speech that is necessary in a therapeutic process. The 
very kinds of narrative explanations that we just surveyed, the explanations that potentially 
helped to reform communal identity for ancient groups exposed to horrific violence, will not be 
therapeutic for individual trauma victims, who encounter trauma as a sort of anti-narrative, but to 
explain fully why this is so we will need to examine trauma as it is understood within literary 
criticism and psychoanalysis, the matter to which we now turn. 
 
Unclaimed experience: literary and psychoanalytical approaches to trauma 
Since the understanding of trauma within literary criticism emerged out of the way 
psychoanalysis understands it, we begin with Freud’s observations about trauma in works 
produced in the wake of World War I. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, published in 1920, 
Freud argues that the root of trauma lies in subjects being unprepared for a massive and horrific 
fright (Schreck). Dreams of trauma victims are very literal repetitions of the traumatic event, 
demonstrating “that the traumatic experience is constantly forcing itself upon the patient,” 
leaving him or her “fixated” to the trauma. These traumatic dreams that repetitively return the 
subject to the very unpleasurable event that caused the trauma are quite unlike normal ones, 
15 
 
which are governed by the pleasure principle.
35
 Organisms normally shield themselves from 
unpleasant stimuli, writes Freud, but trauma breaks through this shield of the pleasure principle if 
subjects are not emotionally prepared for violence at such horrific levels, and as a result it is not 
possible for the self to master the trauma.
36
 This failure of experience results in victims who are 
subjected to trauma’s involuntary repetitions in very literal dreams, a sign, Freud argues, that 
they are unconsciously attempting to create retroactively the prophylactic anxiety that would 
have prepared them for the event and protected them.
37
 As a result, trauma victims do not 
normally remember their trauma, which is what their therapists would like them to do, but repeat 
it.
38
 Without real memory or experience of it, of course, the trauma is not known to the victim in 
the normal sense of the term. And because trauma has not been fully experienced, it is not clear 
to survivors whether or not their trauma is truly part of the self, an issue Freud discusses in an 
introduction to a collection of essays on the “war neuroses” published in 1919, where he 
describes the traumatic neuroses he observed in soldiers as producing a split or conflict in the 
ego.
39
 He gets at this point again in his study of the uncanny, also published in 1919. The 
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 S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (trans. J. Strachey; New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1966-1974), vol. 18, pp. 7-64 (12-14). 
36
 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, pp. 18-25. 
37
 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, pp. 25-27. 
38
 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, pp. 12-17. 
39
 S. Freud, “Introduction to Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses” in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (trans. J. Strachey; New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1966-1974), vol. 17, pp. 207-10. 
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uncanny (Unheimlich), writes Freud, stands against the ego and is dissociated from it. This 
double of the ego has been created by the ego’s defense mechanism as it projected out from itself 
material it found threatening, such as the overwhelming horror individuals encounter in 
traumatic events. The uncanny repeats involuntarily, seems inescapable, and the individual is 
helpless to control it, precisely the helplessness experienced in some dream states, and so it can 
seem as if the self is haunted.
40
 This description of the uncanny seems like the trauma he 
discusses in his introductory essay on the war neuroses, in which he refers to the traumatic ego as 
being a “parasitic double” of the ego and in conflict with it,
41
 the result of the original failure of 
experience. 
Much more recent biomedical studies of trauma have provided support for Freud’s 
observations. In a discussion of the neurobiology of trauma, the psychiatrist Bessel van der Kolk 
writes that in normal situations of danger the amygdala signals the hypothalamus and brain stem 
to release stress hormones that aid one’s ability to fight or flee, but that in cases of overwhelming 
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horror the dorsal vagal complex, part of the parasympathetic nervous system, can be activated, 
shutting down awareness.
42
 Trauma victims are thus unable to truly experience or react to the 
situations of great violence in which they find themselves, reflecting Freud’s observation that 
victims have been overwhelmed by horrific events. Sensory information goes to the thalamus, 
which passes it on to the amygdala and frontal lobes, but this processing of information can 
break down, and for trauma victims it will be encoded as dissociated fragments, traces of 
sensations, images, and sounds, something that is very different than normal memory, and unlike 
normal memories, traumatic ones do not change over time,
43
 which explains why Freud 
encountered victims whose trauma repeated in very literal dreams of the event. Traumatic 
“memories” have not been stored as normal memories are, and they do not become part of 
victims’ sense of self, of the autobiographical story that they tell themselves to make sense of 
who they are,
44
 echoing Freud’s conclusion that trauma is a parasitic double that has not been 
assimilated into the ego. Normal memories that do form part of one’s sense of self change over 
time in order to fit in to an ever-changing self-understanding, but traumatic ones do not because 
they have not been assimilated into the self, and so they are relived rather than remembered. This 
dissociation of trauma from the victim’s sense of self, writes van der Kolk, “is the essence of 
trauma. The overwhelming experience is split off and fragmented, so that the emotions, sounds, 
images, thoughts, and physical sensations take on a life of their own. The sensory fragments of 
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memory intrude into the present, where they are literally relived.”
45
 This failure to experience, 
remember, or integrate trauma into the self means that there is no distinction between past and 
present during traumatic flashbacks, in which the trauma repeats in victims’ lives as if no time 
had passed,
46
 which again reflects Freud’s observations of sufferers’ repetitive and very literal—
or uncanny—dreams of the event. The trauma appears to be neither a part of one’s experiences 
nor of one’s self, and traumatic “memories” are simply fragmented sensations that trauma 
sufferers cannot really make any sense of.
47
  
So when, in discussions of the literary critical and psychoanalytical approaches to trauma, 
we refer to trauma as unclaimed experience, we mean precisely that: the event was not 
experienced in the normal sense of the term, and so it is not remembered in the normal sense of 
the term, and thus cannot really be claimed as an experience by victims because it is not 
integrated into their sense of self in the way normal experiences are, and so survivors encounter 
trauma as an anti-narrative. As Henry Greenspan puts it, a victim’s narrative about trauma is an 
artificial creation, the production of a story for what is a “not-story.” He refers to conversations 
with one Holocaust survivor who tells him that his Holocaust testimony “is not a story. It has to 
be made a story. And with all the frustration that implies.”
48
 Moreover, trauma resists narrative 
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because victims have great difficulty in speaking of it. In part this is because, when victims relive 
trauma, the left hemisphere of the brain, which organizes thought into logical sequences and 
translates perceptions into words, becomes far less active, and the sensations that make up 
traumatic “memories” cannot be verbally expressed.
49
 It thus becomes extremely difficult for 
survivors to articulate traumatic events at all, as this exchange between an interviewer and 
Abraham Bomba, who cut the hair of women at Auschwitz immediately before they were to be 
gassed, demonstrates: 
Interviewer: Go on, Abe. You must go on. You have to. 
Bomba: I can’t. It’s too horrible. Please. 
Interviewer: We have to do it. You know it. 
Bomba: I won’t be able to do it. 
Interviewer: You have to do it. I know it’s very hard. I know and I apologize. 
Bomba: Don’t make me go on please. 
Interviewer: Please. We must go on.
50
 
And even apart from this neurobiological explanation for trauma’s speechlessness, language 
itself reaches its limits and fails in the face of trauma. Jean Améry, who survived Auschwitz and 
torture by the SS, puts it this way: 
It would be totally senseless to try to describe here the pain that was inflicted on me. Was 
it “like a red-hot iron in my shoulders,” and was another “like a dull wooden stake that 
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had been driven into the back of my head”? One comparison would only stand for the 
other, and in the end we would be hoaxed by turn on the hopeless merry-go-round of 
figurative speech. The pain was what it was. Beyond that there is nothing to say. 




Primo Levi makes the same point when he writes that words like “hunger,” “fear,” and “pain” 
mean something entirely different to Holocaust survivors than they do to people who have not 
experienced such trauma.
52
 This, says Elie Wiesel, is why it is impossible to write about the 
Holocaust: “We all knew that we could never, never say what had to be said, that we could never 
express in words, coherent, intelligible words, our experience of madness on an absolute scale…. 
All words seemed inadequate….”
53
 It is not a metaphor to refer to trauma as unspeakable,
54
 and 
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thus as something that refuses narrative, this is literally true. 
Although victims do not truly know their trauma—it is “as close to nescience as to 
knowledge,” as Geoffrey Hartman puts it
55
—trauma is constantly present in its dissociative 
repetition as sufferers are forced to relive it without understanding it. And because victims are 
reliving rather than remembering, trauma constantly freezes time, converting the present into the 
traumatic past. “I’m not alive,” writes Charlotte Delbo in her Holocaust trilogy. “I’m imprisoned 
in memories and repetitions.”
56
 She points to the dissociation of trauma and its repetition, 
trapping her within a traumatic past that is constantly present, a past that cannot be known or 
believed and yet that can seem more real than her post-Auschwitz existence. “I’m not alive,” she 
writes again. “I died in Auschwitz and no one knows it.”
57
 Traumatic repetition colonizes the 
victim’s present, converts it into the traumatic past so that the past trauma alone is real and 
replaces the present. As Caruth writes, trauma “literally has no place, neither in the past, in 
which it was not fully experienced, nor in the present, in which its precise images and 
enactments are not fully understood.”
 58 
Or, as Michael Rothberg puts it in a discussion of 
Delbo’s work, “the past is at once completely present, because trauma stops time, and 
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completely distant, because such time is not susceptible to transformation.”
59
 
Trauma, then, is antithetical to narrative, not simply because survivors do not know and 
are unable to articulate it, but because it freezes the chronology that narrative needs in order to 
proceed. Unlike the normal memories that form part of the autobiographical sense of self and 
thus change as the sense of self does, traumatic “memories,” because they have not been 
assimilated by the self and remain unknown, return in literal repetitions of the past and thus 
freeze time. Trauma time, as Jenny Edkins calls it, is thus very different than the chronological 
time of narrative.
60
 Narratives relate events that characters experience and in which they 
participate in some kind of recognizable chronological framework, but trauma offers neither 
experience nor chronology. Narrative creates order out of chaos as it places different events at 
different points in time and integrates them into a single story, but this is simply not possible 
with trauma.
61
 Stories need beginnings and endings, but trauma cannot provide these, because it 
is the same time repeated over and over.
62
 All that can be grasped about trauma is an absence of 
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encounter, knowledge, and meaning.
63
 Trauma provides no meaning because it is not known and 
cannot be believed, and so one cannot draw conclusions or lessons from it. The impossibility of 
knowledge and time in the context of trauma results in a “crisis of truth,” as Caruth puts it;
64
 
when there is no knowledge of trauma, even by its victims, then it is difficult to refer to its truth, 
and so as her epigraph for None of Us Will Return, the first volume of her trilogy, Delbo writes, 




Assimilation of trauma and fetishistic narrative 
There is thus a clear difference in the sociological and psychoanalytical/literary critical 
approaches to trauma: in the standard view of sociologists, trauma is narrative created by the 
group that produces meaning and explanation and that can work toward social solidarity, while 
from the literary and psychoanalytical understanding, trauma lacks chronology, beginnings, 
endings, experience, knowledge, and meaning, and so is anti-narrative. But if traumatic events 
have affected an entire community and shaken belief in the validity of the group’s worldview, 
then the group will have a very real need to reinforce social cohesion by providing a narrative 
that can make sense of the trauma in a way that reinforces or reformulates important aspects of 
the social worldview. If these narratives are actually effective then they will silence and 
overwrite the trauma of individual victims, which has no place for narrative or meaning. The 
social narrative needs widespread acceptance of its meaning if it is to result in social cohesion, 
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but this will not be possible if many trauma victims speak of the “nescience” and 
meaninglessness of trauma; the social narrative will not succeed, in short, unless individual 
victims repress their trauma. The social narrative may even blame the victims for the horrors 
they suffered, an approach taken by biblical literature, as numerous exegetes have pointed out. 
Converting trauma into a narrative of a well-known national myth, a story of struggle or heroic 
endurance, or something else that converts non-meaning into meaning can turn trauma into a 
familiar and even comforting story,
66
 and some Holocaust histories do precisely this.
67
 From an 
ancient Judean and Israelite standpoint, blaming the victims is itself a comforting narrative 
strategy as it reasserts Yhwh’s control of history and thus validates things built on divine 
legitimacy, such as cultic and leadership institutions. 
These explanatory narratives, however, would not have been therapeutic for individuals 
even if they did result in increased social solidarity, for if trauma victims are to experience a 
therapeutic assimilation of trauma into the self then they must formulate their own speech about 
it.
68
 Only in this way will trauma cease to be the unassimilated “parasitic double” of the self that 
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haunts it and begin to seem like a true experience and memory. Dori Laub, a psychoanalyst who 
works with trauma survivors and who is a founder of the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust 
Testimonies at Yale University, writes that survivors will not be able to truly know and 
assimilate the trauma without speaking their testimony to empathetic listeners who are willing to 
receive it, and the listener, he writes, will become a “co-owner of the traumatic event.”
69
 For 
trauma to be known by victims it must be told by the victim and believed by victim and listener; 
while victims had to endure their trauma passively, in this process they can choose to create 
narratives and so become the subjects of their own speech.
70
 But there are many reasons why it is 
a difficult road to survivors’ creation of a story out of a “not-story,” not least because of the 
failure of experience, knowledge, and chronology in the context of trauma. And because victims 
do not truly know trauma, because it does not appear to be part of the self, it is not something 
they can actually believe—this is why Delbo can say she is not sure that what she writes about 
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her trauma is true—and to come to believe it they must have a listener who is willing to suspend 
disbelief,
71
 although, given the horrors of such testimony, listeners often find this difficult. They 
can experience a range of defensive feelings, such as a sense of numbness, anger unwittingly 
directed at the speaker, an obsession with fact-finding that circumvents the victim’s speech, or 
hyperemotionality, and all of these will impede the testimony.
72
 But without the empathetic 
witness who allows the victim’s speech to proceed, it becomes impossible for sufferers to think 
that anybody could communicate what happened and what is happening to them, or that anyone 
could believe it,
73
 and trauma then remains in the realm of the unbelievable, the unnarratable, 
and the unassimilatable.  
Listening is so difficult that it is much easier to overwrite testimony with comforting 
narratives, and this is as true for the society as a whole as it is for individual listeners. At the 
center of trauma is its overwhelming nature that makes it impossible for victims to experience or 
react to it; for the group, testimony to trauma that is based in the inability to act threatens the 
social belief that individuals should choose to act ethically, to act in ways that the society deems 
to be good and that benefits the community, in other words, and so it is easier for the group to 
construct narratives in which the sufferers are guilty for their choice to act in particular ways or 
to construct other narratives of social goods over trauma. It is sometimes easier, in fact, for 
victims to accept these narratives than to face the absence of knowledge and meaning with which 
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trauma has left them. Lawrence Langer in particular has argued that the need to erase trauma in 
the language of heroism and martyrdom, explanations of trauma using the language of social 
goods, flies in the face of trauma testimonies.
74
 In an event in which victims are utterly 
overwhelmed, there is no ethical choice at all, and questions of morality are moot; testimonies 
demonstrate that trauma victims do not really know if they are subjects or simply objects of the 
events in which they were involved.
75
 Langer refers, for example, to a Holocaust survivor who, 
upon arrival at Auschwitz, was sent to the right with his younger brother while his parents were 
sent to the left to die. Not knowing what this separation meant, he sent his brother after his 
parents. “I feel like I killed him,” he said in his testimony, accepting blame for an act in which he 
bore no responsibility, demonstrating the futility of relying on an ethical system in order to make 
sense of the event.
76
 In a discussion of the actions of a Jewish doctor who poisoned the children 
in a hospital in the Warsaw ghetto before the Nazis could remove them to Treblinka, Langer 
argues that this is not a story of heroism, which is how one surviving leader of the Warsaw 
ghetto uprising described it, but one that points to “the poverty of traditional moral vocabulary 
when we address the subject of human conduct during the destruction of European Jewry.”
77
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But explanatory narratives like the ones Langer rejects provide comfort because they 
restore familiar stories and morals to listeners, including to the victims themselves. Accepting 
explanatory narratives relieves them of having to deliberately speak of the trauma that they 
themselves find difficult to believe, and these narratives can have the benefit of reforming or 
reinforcing important social mores that bolster social solidarity. They are not, however, 
narratives that will allow trauma survivors to provide testimony to empathetic listeners, but ones 
that implicitly call upon victims to repress the overwhelming non-experience of trauma and 
accept stories of social goods or narratives of ethical failures that point to the necessity of those 
goods. Dominick LaCapra describes such stories as totalizing narratives, ones that attempt to 
explain everything and in which mourning is always overcome. This, he writes, is very much like 
the fetishistic narrative that marginalizes trauma and presents historians’ values as realized in the 
past events they narrate.
78
 If trauma goes “beyond the pleasure principle,” fetishistic narrative 
restores pleasure insofar as it avoids and disavows trauma.
79
 This is a fair description of much of 
the biblical literature that has been discussed in scholarly readings of trauma: this literature is 
often totalizing, presenting everything readers need to know to explain the trauma; it can point 
toward a hopeful future when mourning will be overcome; and it presents the writers’ values as 
manifested through God’s work in history. And in constructing the narratives that do this and 
that draw lessons to be learned from traumatic events, the group marginalizes or represses the 
trauma that victims have suffered; the narrative will not create social solidarity if a community 
full of trauma victims refuses to accept its meaning. Nothing is more important in recovery from 
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trauma than social support, writes van der Kolk, but this involves “reciprocity: being truly heard 
and seen by the people around us,”
80
 something that is very different than having one’s voice 
drowned out by a group that explains what victims are to think about their trauma and what 
lessons they are to learn from it. Therapy for trauma victims is possible only when listeners are 
willing to hear and believe the “not-story,” but when a community fails to listen and instead 
insists on a story that promotes a particular worldview and set of social goods, the not-stories 
become unacceptable. This process is not therapeutic for trauma victims, since their trauma is not 
known, and so there are no morals to be drawn from it, no wisdom to be gained from this anti-
knowledge; fetishistic narrative does not actually explain the trauma that repetitively intrudes 
into victims’ lives, it simply overwrites it to promote the social interest. It has been a general 
failure on the part of biblical scholarship to recognize this that has sometimes led us to make 
therapeutic claims for the biblical literature that the writings do not have. 
 
Conclusion: The ethical claim of the Muselmann 
Ancient societies obviously did not use the insights of modern psychotherapy when dealing with 
trauma victims. It is certainly not impossible that some trauma survivors in ancient Judah found 
empathetic listeners who acted as witnesses to their testimony and so allowed them to know and 
integrate their trauma; Lamentations, at least, suggests that something like this could have 
happened.
81
 However, it is not even clear that the speech and consequent assimilation of trauma 
envisioned by psychotherapy for trauma victims would always have been desirable in ancient 
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contexts. Much, if not all, of the biblical literature we discussed in the introduction was produced 
in the context of colonialism, a setting in which we would expect everyday existence to result in 
trauma;
82
 in such a situation victims’ silence concerning their trauma might well have been more 
adaptive as a coping mechanism in lives that would continue to be traumatic than the kind of 
speech psychotherapy sees as necessary for integration of trauma into the self.
83
 Accepting a 
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narrative that blamed them for their pain might have been all ancient Judean or Israelite trauma 
victims were able to psychologically afford, but we should not confuse that acceptance with 
therapy. 
And yet, even if that was the case, this does not alleviate the responsibility contemporary 
scholars have to fully take into account the understanding of trauma in literary criticism and 
psychoanalysis and to point out in their readings of trauma in biblical texts—even when these 
readings are focused only on potential social benefits of the texts—that fetishistic narratives that 
provide meaning and explanation for trauma overwrite the victims’ trauma and claim the 
survivors’ unclaimed experience. This is important lest our readers believe that what is beneficial 
for societies in regard to healing from trauma will necessarily also be therapeutic for individual 
victims, which can seem like the most natural of assumptions; it is especially important if 
pastoral counselors are looking at the ways in which we analyze biblical texts that reflect 
traumatic events. And it is also important if biblical scholars feel as if they have an ethical 
obligation to the voiceless traumatized. In If This is a Man, Levi discusses the difference 
between “the drowned and the saved,” where the drowned are those who in Auschwitz were 
called the Muselmänner, those without the emotional or physical resources to survive more than 
a few months. These were “the backbone of the camp, an anonymous mass, continually renewed 
and always identical, of non-men who march and labour in silence…. One hesitates to call them 
living: one hesitates to call their death death….”
84
 But for Levi, these were the “complete 
witnesses,” and he can only speak in their place, even if bearing witness for them is an 
impossibility.
85
 Their humanity itself was called into question—from the Nazis’ perspective, this 
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was their whole point
86
—but, as Giorgio Agamben notes, to deny them their humanity is to 
repeat what the Nazis did.
87
 We should perhaps feel wary of saying nothing when biblical 
literature denies the traumatized a voice, of feeling free to ignore ancient trauma victims and to 
turn our attention only to the narratives that would silence them. We cannot create trauma 
testimony that died with the victims or that was erased in the texts that are available to us; it is as 
impossible for us to bear witness for these ancient victims of trauma as it was for Levi to bear 
witness for those of the twentieth century. But we send a problematic signal to readers, 
particularly those who might be involved in trauma therapy in some way, when we fail to be 
explicit about the overwriting of victims’ trauma in biblical literature, for then we appear to be 
siding with those who would silence the voice of trauma sufferers and we appear to be ignoring 
the therapeutic need of victims to use their own speech. If biblical scholars will not listen for the 
voice of the traumatized in these texts, or at least emphasize its erasure, then even the traces of 
these voices are lost forever, and a problematic message is sent concerning the therapeutic value 
of the literature.  
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